This paper considers term lengths in a representative democracy where the political issue divides the population on the left-right scale. Parties are ideologically di¤erent and better informed about the consequences of policies than voters are. A short term length makes the government more accountable, but the re-election incentive leads to policy-distortion as the government seeks to manipulate swing voters' beliefs to make its ideology more popular. This creates a trade-o¤: A short term length improves accountability but gives distortions. A short term length is best for swing voters when the uncertainty is large and parties are not very polarized. Partisan voters always prefer a long term length. When politicians learn while in o¢ ce a long term length becomes more attractive for swing voters.
Introduction
As Downs (1957) pointed out, the electorate at large has insu¢ cient incentives to become informed about complicated issues in politics, the functioning of the economy, the e¢ ciency of the welfare state, etc. While the problem may be alleviated since voters receive information from many sources such as media, experts, and interest groups, it is also true that much information from media is cheap talk; "experts" often contradict each other; and di¤er-ent interest groups provide con ‡icting information. Empirical assessments show that a large fraction of the electorate typically is poorly informed. As Bartels (1996) puts it: "The political ignorance of the American voter is one of the best-documented features of contemporary politics". Politicians, on the other hand, are briefed by experts and bureaucrats and it is their job to gather information and take decisions. The asymmetry of information speaks in favor of delegating decision-making from the electorate to elected politicians. Hamilton and Madison made the point in the 63 rd Federalist Paper, when discussing the Senate:
"To a people as little blinded by prejudice or corrupted by ‡attery as those whom I address, I shall not scruple to add, that such an institution may be sometimes necessary as a defence to the people against their own temporary errors and delusions".
In representative democracies, decision making is delegated to politicians. If voters become discontent with the politicians they can vote them out. In this way, politicians are accountable at the end of their term, and an important institutional feature of representative democracy is therefore the term length. Term lengths vary around the world; in the US the presidential term is 4 years, while house and senatorial terms are 2 and 6 years, respectively. In European democracies term lengths typically vary from 4 to 7 years. In Tanzania, Julius Nyerere stepped voluntarily down after 20 years. An important question, which this paper will focus on, is how term lengths a¤ect policies.
Hamilton and Madison discussed in the 62 th and 63 rd Federalist Papers the justi…cations for longer senatorial terms. They focussed on two points: "Responsibility, in order to be reasonable, must be limited to objects within the power of the responsible party, and in order to be e¤ ectual, must relate to operations of that power, of which a ready and proper judgment can be formed by the constituents. ..... it is evident that an assembly elected for so short a term as to be unable to provide more than one or two links in a chain of measures, on which the general welfare may essentially depend, ought not to be answerable for the …nal result"
In other words, terms should be su¢ ciently long such that the results of policies unfold before senators are held accountable. While this sounds eminently plausible, it is associated with a cost, namely that accountability is postponed. An important question in this paper is to identify the important trade o¤s that determine whether the statement is correct. Furthermore, they stressed that legislators need time to acquire expertise, they found "a want of due acquaintance with the objects and principles of legislation. It is not possible that an assembly of men ..., continued in appointment for a short time, and led by no permanent motive to devote the intervals of public occupation to a study of the laws, the a¤ airs, and the comprehensive interests of their country, should, if left wholly to themselves, escape a variety of important errors in the exercise of their legislative trust."
Hamilton and Madison's …rst point indicates that the pros and cons of di¤erent term lengths depend on what kind of policies are salient. In this paper, I consider a society where the salient issue in politics is the "grand issue", the size of government or the size of the welfare state, which divides the population on the left-right scale. Welfare state policies are "long term"; an evaluation of their consequences takes time. Consider, for instance, the much discussed health reform in the US, or a major change of the tax system with new implications for incentives. Furthermore, the left-right divide has important consequences for accountability: When voters become discontent with a right wing government, the alternative option is to elect a left wing government. It is not an option just to elect "a better" government.
Citizens have preferences on policies and their consequences. The relation between policies and consequences is determined by the state of the world, which could be thought of as the e¢ ciency of the welfare state. A large spending on a welfare programme will have di¤erent consequences depending on the e¢ ciency of the programme and tax distortions. As suggested by the quotes above, voters are poorly informed about the complicated mechanisms that determine di¤erent policies'consequences and cannot readily assess the consequences. Nevertheless, they may try to infer information about policy consequences from the fact that the informed government chose speci…c policies.
Voters are divided into partisans and swing voters. While partisans are loyal to their party, swing voters'preferred party may depend on the state of the world. If, for instance, it turns out that the welfare state is e¢ cient in providing its bene…ts and taxation is not so distortionary, swing voters tend to prefer the more leftist party, which opts for a large welfare state.
Voters'poor information implies that swing voters may want to change government when they learn about the state of the world; this speaks in favor of a rather short term length. But with a short term length, the consequences of the enacted polices are not yet known to the voters, and they have to infer information from the government's policies. Since governments do not want to be voted out, they have incentives to manipulate voters'beliefs about the state of the world by distorting the policy choice. A left wing government, who learns that the public sector is in fact ine¢ cient and a new welfare programme therefore is not appropriate, may be reluctant to scale down the programme, since this would reveal the truth about public e¢ ciency and cause swing voters to vote right. The policy distortion will be in direction of the party's ideology -in fact to more extreme policies -in order to persuade swing voters that the state is such that they prefer the party's ideology over the other party's. So, while a short term length improves accountability, it makes re-election a more imminent concern for governments and hence induces policy distortion.
High uncertainty about the state of the world tends to make a short term length preferable for swing voters, since the option of electing another government becomes more valuable. Hence, it may be optimal for swing voters that elections come before all consequences of policies are realized and understood. In contrast, high polarization of parties' ideologies tends to make a long term length better since the policy distortion associated with a short term length becomes large as parties become more eager to win an upcoming election. Partisans stay with their party regardless of the state of the world, so they have no option value of elections. Since a long term length does not lead to policy distortion it is unambiguously better for partisans.
The results are derived in a simple two period model, where an election is held at the start of period one. Under a long term length, this is the only election. Under a short term length a new election is held at the start of period two. At this time voters do not know the state of the world, but they can observe the policy chosen by the …rst period government.
We also brie ‡y consider a term limit. A term limit precludes the reelection of the leadership of the incumbent party but not the party itself. Assuming that the leaders are genuinely ideologically motivated, their interest in future policies does not depend on whether they are personally elected. However, if they cannot be re-elected, the power motive -the rents from o¢ ce -becomes less pregnant, and this reduces the re-election motive and thus the distortions from a short term length.
In a brief extension, we consider the acquisition of expertise, which Hamilton and Madison also referred to. The model con…rms their insight: Acquisition of expertise, per se, speaks in favor of longer term lengths. Learning makes …rst period incumbents more competent. Under a short term length this has two e¤ects: First, they become more popular in the second election, so they are re-elected in more states. This makes the …t of the government's ideology and the state of the world slightly worse for swing voters. This e¤ect is a¤ected by polarization. When polarization is high, the "ideological …t" is very important and the e¤ect of learning less important.
Secondly, it becomes more important for the incumbent to win the election, as the opponent is less competent and this also hurts the incumbent. The increased re-election motive distorts the policy further, and this is bad for voters. In sum, learning tilts the trade o¤ towards a long term length.
Term lengths have been considered in a number of papers recently. In Maskin and Tirole (2004) politicians are also better informed than voters, but unlike in my framework, the electorate is not divided on the left-right scale, the policy space is binary (build a bridge or not) and politicians are not ideologically di¤erent. Instead, their policy preferences may or may not be congruent with the electorates'. If a politician is voted out, the preference of the new politician is chosen at random. The optimal choice between a short term length and "juridical power" (a long term length) depends on how eager the politician is to be re-elected, which is an exogenous feature, unlike in the present paper, where it is in ‡uenced by the polarization of parties. Smart and Sturm (2004) consider Maskin and Tirole's framework and show that term limits reduce the incumbent's incentive to win an election and thus policy distortions, just like it is the case in my framework.
A long term length can be interpreted as a case where the decision maker has life long tenure, like Supreme Court judges or an independent central banker with policy preferences. Hansen (2004) shows that an incumbent government is more likely to establish an independent judicatory if there is higher probability that it loses the next election and if the polarization of politics is larger. Tabellini (2006, 2008) compare politicians with bureaucrats and assume that bureaucrats are motivated by career concerns as in Holmstrom (1999). Schultz (1996) considers policy distortions when politicans are better informed than the electorate and can commit to policies before an upcoming election. If parties' preferences are su¢ ciently polarized, the electoral competition will lead to ine¢ cient policies which do not re ‡ect the state of the world. This distortion occurs regardless of the term length because the parties commit before the election.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model. Section 3 discusses a long term length, while Section 4 discusses a short term length and the e¤ect of a term limit. Section 5 considers the choice of term length, while Section 6 considers learning in o¢ ce. Section 7 concludes and discusses some extensions. Some proofs are in the Appendix.
Basics
Society has to choose a policy x 2 R in each of two periods. The policy is chosen by parties: either the left party L or the right party R: Agents preferences over policies depend on the state of the world, s; which is uncertain and uniformly uniformly distributed on [ z; z]; where z > 0: The state of the world represents a fundamental feature of the economy and does not change rapidly. For simplicity, we assume it is the same in the two periods 1 . Voters are not informed about the state of the world, but they know its distribution.
Each party is headed by a political leader, whose utility depends on the policies in the two periods, x 1 and x 2 , the party's ideology, and the state of the world: Furthermore, the leader is also motivated by the power of o¢ ce: he gets o¢ ce rents b in periods where the party holds o¢ ce. Party R 0 s ideology is r; and the leader's utility is 2
where O t is an indicator variable taking value one, if party R is in o¢ ce in period t; and zero otherwise. Party L 0 s utility function is the same except its ideology is l = r; and that the terms O t b are replaced by
For simplicity, we consider the symmetric case where l = r: Hence, r is a measure of the polarization of parties. Voters have similar utility functions; a voter's ideology is re ‡ected in his idiosyncratic parameter, a: There are two kinds of voters distinguished by how much their bliss points depend on the state of the world as given by the parameter i ; i 2 fp; swg: A fraction 1 > 0 are partisans, p; who always -as will become clear -vote for the same party. Partisans are characterized by p = 1: A fraction > 0 are swing voters, sw; they all have sw = > 1:
Everybody, voters and parties, prefer higher policies in higher states. Partisans agree with the parties on how much policy should depend on the state (they both have p = 1) and their preferred party does not depend on the state. Swing voters, on the other hand, have ideal policies which change more with the state. When the state is lowered, their bliss points swing more to the left than the parties', and they swing more to the right when the state is increased. Swing voters with a close to zero prefer the left party in low states and the right party in high states. There is a continuum of voters and the median a is 0; both among partisans and swing voters. We thus assume that parties have settled on ideological positions, which are ex ante equally popular in the electorate. One interpretation of the model is that party r 0 s bliss point is the median of the right leaning partisan voters' bliss points, see Roemer (2001) or Gomberg et al (2004) . With this interpretation a larger polarization of parties stem from a larger polarization of the electorate.
It appears realistic that the electorate is divided between swing voters and partisans, where the latter tend to be more ideological and have more stubborn views: As an example, leftists tend to opt for a large welfare state -even facing proof that it is ine¢ cient and taxes are highly distortionarywhile rightists tend to opt for a small welfare state -even in face of evidence of its e¢ ciency. Swing voters'opinions, on the other hand, depend more on the e¤ectiveness -or the quality -of the welfare state.
Voters know the preferences of the parties. Clearly, one could imagine this was not the case -in particular if the party has not held power for years. However, we assume that understanding how policies work -the state of the world -is the most complicated and important issue.
Contrary to the voters, the parties are informed about the state of the world, s: As discussed in the Introduction, parties are informed from experts, and the governing party has direct access to the bureaucracy. Furthermore, the leaders of the parties are full time politicians whose job it is to gather the relevant information and take decisions. The electorate, on the other hand, does not have as strong incentives to gather information. In order to simplify the exposition, we assume that voters have no information about the state of the world. This is not necessary for the qualitative results, the important feature is that there is some part of the state of the world which is observed by parties only. One could alternatively assume that s = s v + s g ; and voters only know s v ; while the parties know both s v and s g :
As is discussed in the literature on the Condorcet Jury Theorem, see for instance Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) , the majority vote may end up as if the electorate is informed if the electorate is su¢ ciently large, even though each individual only receives a noisy signal on the state. This is relevant if the information is dispersed in society. However, there are also many instances where the government has privileged access to information, such as complicated analyses of the tax system or the details of various budgets made in the bureaucracy, where the Jury Theorem appears less relevant. We focus on this kind of information. As brie ‡y touched upon in the Introduction, there is much evidence suggesting that the electorate is rather poorly informed about economic issues.
A long term length
When the term length is long, voters elect a party before date 1, which governs for both periods. The leadership of the winning party needs not worry about re-election and chooses its preferred policy, given knowledge of the state, regardless of the views of the voters. The median voter (whether partisan or swing), who does not know the state of the world, is indi¤erent between the parties. We will assume this implies that each party wins with probability 1=2: The expected utility for voter (a; i ) from a long term length is therefore 3
Letting 2 = z 2 =3 denote the variance of the state of the world, s; we get
The larger the degree of polarization is, the less attractive is a long term length. The advantage of a long term length is that the policy re ‡ects the state of the world, since the governing party knows the state and have no incentives to distort the policy. A partisan voter, with p = 1; …nds that the party perfectly responds to the state of the world and the variance of the state is therefore inessential for such a voter. This is not so for a swing voter, who …nds that the party's policy responds too little to the state of the world. The expected utility of a swing voter is therefore decreasing in the variance of the state of the world.
A short term length
Under a short term length, the …rst election is held in the start of period one. The winning party observes the state of the world and chooses the …rst period policy, which is observed by the voters. In the start of period two, a new election takes place, and the new winner chooses the second period policy.
We follow Hamilton and Madison and consider policies where it takes time for the e¤ects to materialize, so their utility consequences are only learned after the second election is held. As discussed in the Introduction, the welfare e¤ects of expanding health care come after some while and major tax reforms take time to spell out. The voters can therefore not infer the state directly from the knowledge of the policy and the experienced utility and have to rely on whatever information is contained in the policy choice of the governing party. 4 The party knows that the voters form beliefs in this way and it may therefore have an incentive to distort policy in order to induce beliefs, which will help it win the election.
An equilibrium under a short term length is a pure strategy Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the game just described. In the …rst period, the winning party chooses the policy 5 , x (s) ; which maximizes its expected utility for both periods given the state of the world, s; taking into account its own and the other party's strategies for the next period and the way voters form beliefs. Since voters know that the governing party is informed about the state, they update their belief about the state of the world after observing the policy, using Bayes' rule and the governing party's strategy for the …rst period, x ( ) ; whenever this is possible. A voter votes for the party, whose second period policy gives him highest expected utility, given his beliefs 6 . Finally, the winner of the second election chooses a policy which maximizes its second period utility given the state of the world.
In the second period, the parties have no re-election concerns and choose their bliss points r + s and r + s; respectively. Party R 0 s second period utility is 0 + b if it wins, and ( r + s (r + s)) 2 if L wins, and the gain from winning is
Party L 0 s gain from winning is the same. Voters foresee the parties'second period choices. When voters observe a …rst period equilibrium policy x; they update beliefs using Bayes'rule. If voters observe x and know that x is only chosen in state s; they can infer that the state is s: If x is chosen in many states, they can only infer that it is one of those states. Let s e (x) be the expected state after observing x: Since all agents, voters as well as parties, prefer higher policies in higher states, the …rst period incumbent's policy is non-decreasing in s: This is shown in Lemma 1 in the Appendix. If x 0 and x both are equilibrium policies and x 0 > x it therefore follows that s e (x 0 ) s e (x) : This fact does not depend on out of equilibrium beliefs. If voters observe an out of equilibrium policy, y; which should not be chosen in any state according to the incumbent's strategy, Bayes'rule is not applicable. As is well known, this indeterminacy of beliefs can give rise to many equilibria. We will assume that beliefs are monotone in the sense that if x is an equilibrium policy and voters observe an out of equilibrium policy y > x then s e (y) s e (x) and conversely that s e (y) s e (x) if y < x: Since all agents'(voters'as well as parties') preferred policies are increasing in the state, this seems a reasonable restriction on beliefs
As the equilibrium policy is non-decreasing, and the state is uniformly distributed, voters'updated belief after observing an equilibrium policy
The higher is the expected state, the more swing voters prefer party R; while partisans with a > 0 prefer party R and those with a < 0 prefer party L regardless of the state. Hence, the election is determined by the median swing voter and party R wins if the expected state is positive and loses otherwise 7 . The …rst period incumbent has an incentive to manipulate the voters' beliefs in order to be re-elected. If, for instance, the state is negative, but close to zero, party L will win if voters learn the truth. An incumbent party R therefore has an incentive to act as it would if the state were positive, so that it will be re-elected. In equilibrium, such mimicking should not pay o¤, so when the state is just positive, party R has to choose a policy so high, that it will not prefer to mimic it when the state is slightly negative. In equilibrium there is therefore an interval of states [s 1 ; s 2 ]; situated around s = 0; where the incumbent distorts the policy. An R incumbent distorts upwards and an L incumbent distorts downwards (since it is most popular in the low states). This is shown formally in Lemmas 2 and 3 in the Appendix 8 . 7 If the expected state is zero, the median swing voter is indi¤erent. We assume that the incumbent wins in this case. This tie-breaking rule simpli…es a few steps in the proofs, but has no impact on the results. 8 The restriction on out of equilibrium beliefs is used in Lemma 3, where it is shown that there is only one pooling interval [s1; s2] with policy x and it is situated around s = 0. Say R is incumbent. The restriction excludes the existence of another pooling interval for states s > s2. Without the restriction, such an interval, with pooling policy x 0 ; could exist, since voters'beliefs could be that the state is negative if they do not observe either x or x 0 : Belief monotonicity ensures that for any policy x > x; s e (x) s e ( x) ; so the R incumbent will not be punished by beliefs if he chooses his bliss point when r + s > x: A similar argument is used in Lemma 4. When the gain from winning the election, G (b; r) ; becomes larger, the distortion has to be larger in order to prevent mimicking. The policy becomes more distorted in a given state and the interval of states with distortion becomes longer. Lemma 4 shows this more precisely. As often in signalling games, there is a continuum of equilibria, according to where precisely the pooling interval is located around s = 0. Lemma 5 gives the possible locations. We will focus on the most informative equilibrium from the point of view of the median voter. In this equilibrium, voters learn whether the state is positive or negative, and the median swing voter is able to cast her vote based on the information she needs. Hence, in the second period, the elected government is her most preferred given the actual state. Although the formulas would be a bit more complicated, the qualitative results would not change by focussing on one of the other possible equilibria. Proposition 1 is proven in the Appendix.
Proposition 1 Consider a short term length. If R is incumbent its …rst period equilibrium policy in the most informative equilibrium is
If L is incumbent its …rst period policy is
The Proposition is illustrated in Figure 1 for the case where R is incumbent and p G (b; r) < z: When s is very high, R chooses its bliss point. This is credible information for the swing voters that the state is high, since party R would not …nd it worthwhile to deviate to this policy, had the state been negative, even though the gain would be that it won the election. For states between 0 and p G (b; r); party R distorts its policy upwards in order to be re-elected. If it chooses a lower policy, voters will believe that it is a negative state and elect party L for the next period. The distortion is so large that party R does not …nd it worthwhile to deviate to this policy in a negative state. In negative states, party R chooses its bliss point and faces defeat in the upcoming election. As is clear from the Proposition and Figure 1 , the pooling interval is longer the stronger the incentive to win the election is, i.e. the higher is polarization, r; and bene…ts from power, b.
When a term limit is present, the incumbent leadership of the government cannot be re-elected. If the leadership is genuinely interested in politics its interest in future policies remains unchanged. However, since it cannot be re-elected, it is not able to reap the future bene…ts of o¢ ce and it seems reasonable to assume that it then puts less weight on the future rents from o¢ ce; b: Glancing at the Proposition, we see that then the e¤ect of a term limit is that the policy distortion is reduced.
At the …rst election, voters have no further information about the state, so each party wins with probability 1/2. The expected utility in the …rst period for voter a; i is therefore
At the second election, voters elect party L if s < 0 and party R if s > 0; and the incumbent -whoever it is -if s = 0 9 : The expected utility in the second period for voter a; i evaluated at date 0 is therefore
which simpli…es to
5 The choice of term length
Using (3) and (7); and denoting the second period utility under a long term length u LT 2 ; we can write the di¤erence between the second period expected utilities under a short and a long term length as
This is the gain from accountability. It stems from the voters' ability to choose government depending on the state when the term length is short. It is positive for all all swing voters (with sw = > 1). The higher is r; the degree of polarization, and z; the uncertainty about the state of the world, the more valuable is accountability for these voters. The partisan ( p = 1) voters' preferred government, on the other hand, does not depend on the state, so their expected utility is the same regardless of term length. When the term length is short, the incumbent distorts policy in some states in order to attract swing voters, while this is not needed when the term length is long. In other states, the incumbent chooses its bliss point under both term lengths. The …rst period expected utility is therefore higher for all voters when the term length is long. When p G (b; r) z; such that incumbent R (L) does not have to distort policy in all positive (negative) states in order to win, the loss from a short term length is (using (3), (6) ; and Proposition 1)
Notice that both the gain (8) and the loss (9) from a short term length are independent of a voter's bliss point: Using (8) and (9) gives (10) in the following Proposition 10
Proposition 2 A long term length is always best for partisan voters. For swing voters a short term length is best i¤ the gain from accountability exceeds the loss from the …rst period distortion. This is the case if when uncertainty is su¢ ciently large relative to the gain from winning the election, i.e. when 2 > G (b; r) 3 and
It is also the case when uncertainty is not so large but the swing voters' bliss points are su¢ ciently sensitive to the state, namely when:
In (10) the last inequality is the binding restriction i¤
which is less than 2: Regardless of whether the …rst or the last inequality binds in (10) it is therefore the case that a larger polarization tends to make it more di¢ cult to ful…l (10), so it is less likely that a short term length is preferred. When the uncertainty is small relative to polarization, so that the gains from winning the election are so high that the incumbent distorts policy in all states where he is going to be re-elected, i.e. when G (b; r) > 3 2 = z 2 cf. Proposition 1; then the condition for when the swing voter prefers a short term length is given in (11) . The condition reveals that if swing voters are su¢ ciently sensitive to the state, they prefer a short term length even though uncertainty is small relatively to the gain of winning. The reason is that their (expected) ideal policies are so extreme compared with the parties' that the distortion brings polices closer to their ideal policies 11 . The right hand side is decreasing in z; so the higher the uncertainty, the more types of swing voters prefer a short term length. As the right hand side tends to in…nity as z becomes vanishingly small we have that for any given ; if the uncertainty becomes su¢ ciently small, then the swing voter will prefer a long term length. When polarization r or bene…ts from o¢ ce b increases, so that the gain from winning the election increases, the right hand side increases. Hence the larger polarization, the more types of swing voters prefer a long term length. When r tends to in…nity all types of swing voters prefer a long term length. Hence, (11) re ‡ects the same trade o¤s as (10) .
Proposition 2 highlights that partisans and swing voters have fundamentally di¤erent interests with respect to term lengths. The partisans are not interested in accountability, since they …nd that the parties adjust policy adequately to the state. They focus on the negative e¤ect of a short term length: The policy distortion coming from the re-election incentive. Swing voters, on the other hand, value the opportunity to oust a government if they …nd that the state calls for the policies of the other party. This value dominates if the uncertainty of the state of the world is su¢ ciently large relative to the policy distortion. If the term length is chosen in a popular vote at a constitutional stage, the choice depends on whether partisans or swing voters are in majority.
When a term limit is e¤ective, the leadership of the party governing in period 1 cannot be re-elected. If this implies that o¢ ce rents b weigh less for the leadership, then G (b; r) decreases and the policy distortion under a short term length is smaller. This makes it more likely that condition (10) is ful…lled and that swing voters prefer a short term length.
Learning in o¢ ce
As discussed in the Introduction, Hamilton and Madison argued that legislators'acquisition of expertise takes time and this speaks for longer term lengths. In this paper we have so far taken the view that legislators are informed agents, but we will now shortly address how the trade o¤ between a short and a long term length is a¤ected by learning. In order to introduce this feature as simple as possible, we assume that the …rst period is unchanged. The …rst period state is still s; but there is an additional shock, "; to the state of the world in period 2, which is uniform on [ v; v]; where v > 0; so the state in period two is
The ability to acquire the relevant information increases if the politician has spent time in o¢ ce: We assume that the …rst period incumbent observes the new shock, while the opponent does not: More generally, one could assume that the …rst period incumbent learns the second period shock with a larger probability than the opponent. This would add nothing qualitatively but make formulas longer. The crucial issue is that the incumbent learns more than the opponent. Since both parties are equally inexperienced in the …rst period, there is no asymmetry here, and for simplicity we assume that they are both capable of observing the …rst period state.
We will investigate the case, where the expertise of the incumbent is not of overwhelming importance. The variance, v 2 =3; of " ful…ls
where 1 4 2 1
1 : As will become clear, if this condition is not met, then the incumbent will get the vote of all swing voters even in the state where he is most unpopular.
Under a long term length, the government chooses its bliss point in period one. In period two it is experienced and learns "; and for instance R chooses r + s + ": The expected utility for voter a; i is
This is as before (compare with (3)), except that the swing voters su¤er a utility loss, since they do not …nd that the policy responds su¢ ciently much to the new uncertainty, just as it is the case with s:
Then consider a short term length. If, for instance, party R wins the second election, it observes " and chooses policy r + s + " if it was the …rst period incumbent, while if it were not it does not observe " and chooses r + s. When a voter's belief is s e ; she prefers the incumbent, party R; if
(compare with (5)). Former partisan L voters with p = 1; and v 2 3 1 4r < a < 0; will now vote for incumbent R; since it is more experienced. The election therefore depends on the fraction of such voters. This could easily be taken into account but in order not to cloud the formulas, we will assume that there are no such voters. So, a voter with p = 1; has jaj >
The learning gives an incumbency advantage. 12 The swing voters face a trade o¤: The incumbent has larger expertise, but his ideology may not be the one they prefer in the expected state. Condition (15) is the outcome of this compromise and we see that swing voters re-elect R even in some (not too) negative states. This compromise makes a short term length less attractive for the swing voters. The e¤ect is larger when there is more second period uncertainty, and smaller when there is more polarization. When polarization is large it is important for the swing voters that the government's ideology corresponds to the state. Then di¤erences in expertise weigh less. The learning of expertise increases the stakes in the election for the …rst period incumbent, since the second period policy of the inexperienced opponent now becomes even worse for him. If party R is re-elected it will choose r+s+" in state s+"; this gives expected utility 0: If the inexperienced opponent L wins, it will choose r + s in state s + ": The gain from winning for incumbent R; G (b; r; v) ; is therefore
The larger is the second period uncertainty, the larger are the gains from winning the election. The length of the pooling interval is determined by this gain, and it will now be longer and equal to p G (b; r; v): We focus on the case where the …rst period uncertainty is so large that the pooling interval does not cover all states where the incumbent wins, which means that 3 2 > (12) is ful…lled. When a government acquires expertise during its tenure, the swing voters prefer a short term length if
G (b; r; v) 3 (17)
Comparing with Proposition 2, we see that experience changes the trade o¤ between a short and a long term length. If the second period variance, v 2 =3; equals zero, (17) is the same as (10) . Two e¤ects can identi…ed. First the distortion increases: The pooling interval becomes longer under a short term length as the incumbent is more eager to win the election. If < 2 1 + r p G so that the swing voters are not very sensitive, and dislike distortions, this makes the …rst term in (17) larger than the corresponding term in (10) , and it also increases the second term. This e¤ect makes a short term length less attractive: The second term is positive under condition (12) and it is increasing in v 2 3r . This e¤ect, which stems from the poorer "…t of ideology and state" also makes a short term length less attractive.
Concluding remarks
When voters are poorly informed about the consequences of policies they may wish to replace governments in face of new information, and governments' incentives are in ‡uenced by this. While a short term length has the advantage that voters can replace a government faster, it has the disadvantage that governments'incentives to be re-elected make them distort policies. A long term length gives less accountability and less distortion. When uncertainty about the state of the world is large and parties are not too polarized, then swing voters will prefer a short term length since accountability is most important. When polarization is high and uncertainty low, they prefer a long term length. Learning in o¢ ce twists this trade o¤, but does not change it fundamentally. Partisans unambiguously prefer a long term length.
I have focussed on the case where it is more di¢ cult for voters to learn about the consequences of policies than the politicians'preferences, as I believe this is most important. However, voters may also be uncertain about parties'preferences. This may in particular be relevant when party's leadership changes. Schultz (2002) considers the case where voters have inferior information both about the state of the world and the preferences of the parties at the same time. Uncertainty about preferences in itself leads to a bias towards more centrist policies, i.e. in the opposite direction of the bias stemming from uncertainty about the state. This distortion is bene…cial for voters and it would tend to make a short term length more attractive. This case is discussed in a previous working paper version of this paper 13 .
The polarization of parties has been taken as an exogenous variable. However, it is a natural thought that party ideology may depend on the electoral system as such and term lengths in particular. Preliminary investigations of two-candidate equilibria in a citizen-candidate model do point to this. As is well known, the equilibria in citizen-candidate models depend on the incentives to enter at the candidate state. The incentive to enter can be shown to be stronger under a long term length than under a short, since candidates do not need to distort their policy under a long term length. This suggests that polarization will be smaller under a long term length; since the gain from entering is larger, more moderate types will …nd it worthwhile to pay the entry cost. This will be the subject of further research.
Throughout the paper I assume that both parties are unable to commit to a policy before an election. But one could imagine that by setting up a particular administration, a party in o¢ ce is capable of committing to a particular set of policies to a degree a party in opposition is not. It is an interesting question how the results would be a¤ected if the …rst period incumbent can commit to second period policies while the opponent cannot. At …rst sight, it appears to give the incumbent an advantage, since he has the option to chose more centrist policies and become more popular with the median voter. However, with information problems, the second period policy is a signal for the state, just as the …rst period policy is, and the incumbent's problem is to signal optimally with two signals. How this would a¤ect results is a non-trivial, interesting question, which will be the subject of further research.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1.
We …rst show a few Lemmas with properties of Perfect Bayesian Equilibria.
Lemma 1
The …rst period government's policy is non-decreasing in s:
Proof. Let s 2 > s 1 and let e.g. k 1 be the period two expected utility consequence for the government from choosing x (s 1 ) in the …rst period. If the incumbent is party R; the optimally of x (s 1 ) and of x (s 2 ) yield
(If L is incumbent r is exchanged with r). Adding and rearranging yield
Lemma 2 There is no completely separating equilibrium, where the voters learn s for all s 2 [ z; z]:
Proof. Assume that party R is the incumbent, (if L is incumbent the proof is symmetric). From Lemma 1 we have that if the equilibrium is separating then party R 0 s …rst period policy x (s) is strictly increasing in s: Assume that the equilibrium is indeed separating. Party R will then win the second election if s 0 and loose otherwise. Consider s = "; where " > 0 is small. By choosing x ( "), party R looses the election, while it wins if it chooses x ("). As the gain from winning is b + 4r 2 ; it has to be the case that
otherwise party R will deviate from x ( ") to x (") : As it looses for s < 0; it chooses its bliss point, x ( ") = r "; so lim "!0 x ( ") = r; and (18) gives
Since the policy is non-decreasing and lim "!0 x ( ") = r; we have lim "!0 x (") r , so the parenthesis above is non-negative and we get
Consider " 2 > " 1 > 0; then party R wins whether it chooses x (" 2 ) or x (" 1 ) :
Since the equilibrium is separating we have that
For " 2 < p b + 4r 2 we have that
But then party R prefers to choose x (" 1 ) in state s = " 2 : the …rst period utility is higher than if it chooses x (" 2 ) and it stills wins the election. This contradicts that the equilibrium is separating for all s:
We thus have that in any equilibrium, there will be some s 0 s, where the …rst period incumbent chooses the same policy. The next Lemma shows that there is only one value of the policy x for which pooling occurs and this occurs over an interval of states. Outside this pooling interval, the equilibrium is separating. The proof uses the assumption of monotonicity of out of equilibrium beliefs. If x is the policy of a pooling interval and R is incumbent, then s e ( x) 0; while if L is incumbent, s e ( x) 0:
Lemma 3 In a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
Proof. The …rst statement follows directly from Lemma 1: Look at the second statement. Again assume party R is incumbent. If the two intervals are overlapping, then x 1 = x 2 : Suppose therefore that s 0 1 < s 2 and that x 1 < x 2 : For s 2 [s 1 ; s 0 1 ]; party R chooses x 1 . There is at most one s 2 [s 1 ; s 0 1 ] where x 1 = r+s: This implies that party R must win the second election after choosing x 1 ; otherwise it would be better to deviate to r+s for s such that x 1 6 = r+s: This implies that s e (x 1 ) 0 (and thus also the last statement in the Lemma). By a similar argument s e (x 2 ) 0: Consider s 2 [s 2 ; s 0 2 ] for which x 2 6 = r + s: If x 2 < r + s party R would be better o¤ deviating to r + s; since, by monotonicity of beliefs, s e (r + s) s e (x 2 ) 0; so the party would still win the election. If x 2 > r + s; the party can deviate to x 2 " > x 1 . For small "; this is a better …rst period policy and, by monotonicity of beliefs, s e (x 2 ") s e (x 1 ) 0; so the party still wins the election. We conclude that x 1 < x 2 is not compatible with equilibrium.
Finally, s e ( x) 0 clearly implies s 2 0: Suppose s 1 > 0: Then there is an interval [ "; "] around zero where " < s 1 ; and party R 0 s policy is separating. As in the proof of Lemma 2 this gives a contradiction.
For all states in the pooling interval except possibly one party R su¤ers a …rst period loss by choosing the pooling policy x; this can only be optimal if it subsequently wins the election. 
Outside the pooling interval, party R chooses x (s) = r + s
Proof When party R chooses x, then (from Lemma 3) s e ( x) 0; and R wins the election. By monotonicity of beliefs, if party R chooses x > x it also wins. This implies that x r + s 2 ; otherwise party R would deviate to r + s 2 at s 2 and still win the election. Hence for all s < s 2 we have r + s < x: The largest gain from deviation is then at s 1 : Here the party is indi¤erent between deviating to r + s 1 and loose the election and choose x and win, this implies ( x r s 1 ) 2 = b + 4r 2 this gives (19). Outside the pooling interval the equilibrium is separating (Lemma 3) and the equilibrium policy is increasing (Lemma 1), therefore when s < s 1 : s e (x (s)) = s < s 1 < 0, and party R looses the election. Hence, it chooses its bliss point r + s: When s > s 2 ; s e (r + s) = s > s 2 > 0; and party R wins the election by choosing its bliss point. Clearly, this is then optimal. There is a continuum of equilibria according to where the pooling interval is situated: Lemma 5 gives the possible locations.
We focus on the most informative equilibrium from the point of view of the median swing voter, where she learns whether the state is positive or not. Here the left endpoint of the pooling interval, when R is incumbent is s 1 = 0: The …rst part of Proposition 1, concerning the case where R is incumbent, now follows straightforwardly Lemmas 4 and 5: The proof for L is symmetric.
Proof of Proposition 3.
Let y = In the second period the expected utility is as follows: With probability (21) and comparing with the expected utility from a long term length (13) gives the condition in Proposition 3.
